This begs the question: why is it that the world's trade ministers (whose success is measured largely by their ability close trade deals) are charged with rewriting national agricultural policies (as opposed to, say, the world's agriculture ministers who have a much firmer grasp on the importance, constraints and dynamism of the world food system)?

re Adam's question. In the case of the United States, the U.S. Department of Agriculture provides U.S. negotiators with support, analysis, & had the dominant large role in determining the initial position of the U.S. and the acceptability of other countries’ offers. I am sure that this is true for other countries.

On a sarcastic note: Ministries of Agriculture generally overestimate the importance of agriculture, farm policy is one of the important constraints on agriculture, & farm policy is generally designed to reduce the dynamism of the food system.

Further re: Adam's question, if it were up to national agriculture ministries and departments farm trade talks wouldn't happen at all. Even during the Reagan administration Congressional resistance to reducing subsidies and trade barriers was supported from within the bureaucracy at USDA. European farm ministries are even worse (USDA's constituency, unlike that of its European and Japanese counterparts, includes many farmers who want export opportunities more than they fear import competition). Agriculture departments want to support farmers; their employees depend for their livelihoods on programs designed to do this. For the most part they have little incentive to support trade negotiations that if successful will reduce their own role and disappoint farmers used to extensive government support.

Zathras:

Generally speaking, the USDA has been officially pro-trade-liberalization, reflecting the priorities of the last few administrations. The positions of the long-term employees varies by Agency. For example, the Economic Research Service, being full of economists, generally supports economic efficiency & market liberalization. The “blue box” policies suggested by the WTO also allow governments a wide range of latitude in writing checks to farmers.

Regarding Prof D’s comments about the importance of Brazil & India. Brazil and India allied themselves during the Cancun meetings against the existing draft agricultural agreement. This was an important cause of the failure in Cancun. There will be no agreement on agriculture without their approval. (Google WTO, Cancun, agriculture & Brazil to find reports & commentary on last fall’s failed Cancun meetings & the Brazilian & Indian roles.)