the koreans backpedalled like mad today -- see the FT. tho i do think that at least the central bank is rather tired of adding to its treasury portfolio.

Correllation is not coordination. It's true that Asian countries desire to maximize exports to the American market influences their central banks' purchases of dollars, but they did not need American assistance or encouragement for this. Fear of what sudden change might do to their exports and to the rest of their economies is a factor now for them, as it is for us, but that too is more a result of similar perceptions of the fundamentals than it is of coordination between the governments. The South Koreans more than the Chinese seem to be having some doubts about those fundamentals.

The difference is that China, South Korea and other Asian governments are pursuing a deliberate policy to grow their respective economies in a certain way. The Bush administration has merely been trying to keep the economy humming along well enough to get itself through the 2004 election, and now to prevent a renewal of high interest rates, inflation or both. The effect is to place the power of decision over the future of the American economy more and more in foreign hands.

"Gross said U.S. and Asian nations seem to have entered a political pact, whereby Americans can consume cheap imported goods and afford houses, while Asians can protect their economies, create jobs and maintain competitive currency values."

I didn't think he said this. I thought half the article was about how asset prices have been going up because Greenspan engineered 5 year Treasuries higher. And that now the 5 year has reached the 0% real return barrier. So the asset increases are probable gone.

I thought his essay had a lot of facts which are probable correct, but no actionable information. Or I guess you need to know more than I do to be able to take some type of action.

that's a gross misinterpretation of gross, if i may say. if anyone has eyes to read tho, he explicitly states:

"This bullish scenario is not without its risks, be they geopolitical, trade, oil, or internal budget popping related in the U.S. or Euroland. In addition, anything that threatens BWII or resembles a 'helicopter money' monetary response described by Ben Bernanke could ultimately be bond market destructive."

while gross' bond bullish scenario is predicated on BW2, it is not an endorsement of its stability. in fact earlier in the piece he says that BW2 is inherently in an unstable equilibrium. rather, it's his belief in the limitations of the fed's "asset pump" that's why he thinks rates can move lower, a wholly different concept that he explains in the second half of his article, which again weakly assumes as given the persistence of BW2. his verdict? the US is an emperor whose clothes are stitched out of threads that "have been secured on the back of rapidly increasing debt, resulting in a 6% of GDP balance of trade deficit, and that debt has been extended to consumers only because of asset appreciation in the financial and housing markets."

moreover:

It isn't prudent for U.S. citizens to continue to expect to consume 6% more than they produce, nor is it rational for investors to expect foreign central banks – primarily the Chinese and Japanese – to invest that 6% surplus and other direct investment monies into the U.S. Treasury market forever. At some point it comes undone, either through a massive revaluation and dollar decline, a Treasury buyer's boycott, or a whimpering U.S. consumer beaten down by the cost and/or amount of their burgeoning leverage – much of which is housing related. Geopolitical risks abound as well with North Korea, Taiwan, and Iran serving as potential flash points. Since the Bretton Woods II arrangement currently seems to satisfy giver and taker, consumer and maker, it should survive for a few years. Cross those fingers, though.

To some of us "a few years" is a while.

And given that gross was arguing in dec/ jan to steer clear of longer terms bonds, his embrace of duration and his 4.5 to 3.0 call (if BW2 lasts) was a bit of a shift. It is, as you note, premised on the assumption that interest rates cannot fall all that much lower, and thus the "Asset pump" is on its last legs since the long-term decline in interest rates (rise in asset prices) can only go a bit further, limiting inflationary pressure ...

Dan -- seems like my readers are a bit more about korea's reserves than yours. on the other hand, i sometimes have trouble ginning up comparable interest in geopolitical issues ... non-overlapping audiences, apart from Godement, i suspect.

again, "is going to last a while" is different from 'should last a few years with fingers crossed'. i think he presents a more nuanced argument than you (and certainly barnhart) give him credit for. and recall, he was synthesizing the findings of the secular forum and not necessarily providing his own view, altho i would not begrudge a bond guru a shift (an evolution if you will) over several months as new data accumulates, even if it happens to be a 10-year note yield pushing 4%... how else to explain the conundrum? i thought he/they did an adequate if not admirable job; more 'honest' than anything the fed has provided lately, in any event, i think. it's nice having a 'shadow' fed around for a reality check, or at least a second opinion.

After following the dollar daily for the past few weeks, I resorted to my old economics text book by Gwartney et al. Just re-reading the fundamentals of foreign currency and sitting back and pondering the news has made more sense than trying to wade through the swamp of experts.

All these comments and Daniel's own commentary I think miss the point. Sure, the US policy towards the dollar is a fun political football to toss (or kick) about. But if you really care what direction the dollar will go from here you have to look at the big picuture. In particular you have to ask whether the dollar is low or high relative to its historical range. Moroever, you have to ask where most people expect the dollar to go from here. Compare to its range of the past 30 years of 78 to 164, the dollar index today at 86 is low. And everyone I read, especially the New York Times, thinks the dollar has to go down over the next couple of years. I think you can safely assume that the dollar index will not drop below the 80 level it reached on December 31, 2004 and will move up above 100 over the next couple of years.

Carl -- depends a bit on what you want to look at. I know lots of folks on the street follow the dollar index closely. I don't fully understand why -- it is a composite of the euro, pound, yen, canadian dollar, swiss franc and swedish kroner (with maybe some aussie $ thrown in). As a proxy for the "dollar"s external value, it increasingly looks dated. No mexican peso, brazilian real, indian rupee, korean won, taiwanese dollar or chinese RMB. It it is relevant if you want to hedge certain types of exposure, but as a indicator of broad $ strength, it doesn't work. it is in an indicator of $ strength/ weakness v. certain advanced, formerly industrialized economies ... (china = industrialized economy right now, but it lacks a convertible currency).

I don't have complete certainty about the dollar's direction on the dollar index or any other index -- i certainly would not have bet on the strength of the current $/ euro rally. But if the dollar stays at its current level, i am confident that -- with normal growth in the us and the rest of the world -- the trade deficit will tend to widen. you either that is fine, and poses no problems, since the financing will be there -- in which cases, there is no short-term obstacle to a sustained $ rally over the next couple of years. I tend to think that view is off -- and the markets will react to a 6% of GDP heading to 7% of GDP trade deficit (and a larger current account deficit), and thus the dollar will tend to depreciate from current levels over time across a broad range of currencies. To me, it is hard to bet on a sutained appreciation of the currency of any economy with as large a set of deficits as the us.

Thanks!