Questions about Pakistan:

Why does Osama have a haven in Pakistan?

Why did Pervez Musharraf promise GWB he would give up one of his titles (head of military and keep head of state) after a year and then renege?

Why did A.Q. Kahn, the Pakistani chief of things nuclear, get a pardon from Pervez after it was learned that Pakistan was distributing nuclear technology in the region?

Why is Pakistan building a second nuclear reactor at their weapons facility? Why was it that this was brought to the world's attention by non-governmental scientists when our intelligence services must also have known? [you can see the site in Google Earth].

What should we guess about the future of Pakistan and regional distribution of nuclear bombs?

Fact: Pakistan imports 80% of oil needs.
Fact: Pakistan has atomic bombs.
Fact: Pakistan is being allowed by the USA to greatly expand nuclear reactor capabilities.
Fact: Iran has oil

If Iran joins North Korea in "agreeing with Condi to dismantle xxx" thus diffusing the current crisis what prevents them from simply going shopping in Pakistan for finished product?

Dan,
My opinion might be a little biased as i am from India, but i will try to give a fair shake to the question, why Musharaff can crack down on the Kashmiri separatists while he's allowing Al-Qaeda type groups to flourish.

Ideally Musharaff would like to do nothing about either the Kahmiri's or Al-Qaeda. How ever post 9/11 when the role of Pakistan's military as the main sponsors of the Taliban became very hard to ignore, along with the fact that Pakistani nationals (including Khalid Sheik Muhammad) were so closely involved in global terrorism, it became impossible for Pakistan to keep the Kashmiri terror front going.Bush's "You are with us or against us" and Armitage's threat to blow Pakistan to the dark ages were not empty ones - they were real and Musharaff had to focus Pakistan's energies on fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Kashmir had to go into the backburner.

The terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001 followed by India's threat to retaliate with nuclear war was the final nail in the Kashmiri terrorist coffin. Nuclear war was prevented but not before India managed to get the US reign in Musharaff on the Kashmir issue. It is no strange coincidence that violence in Kashmir which was mind numbing in the 90's is now at an all time low - when India and Pakistan have been trying to talk "peace" for the last 4 years, with American prodding.

Now, lets come to Al-Qaeda. Musharaff initially helped the US forces in the offensive against the Taliban - he had to. But he is not the only one in the Pakistani military who needs to change. The top dogs @ ISI never liked the anti Taliban war and went along as much as they "could".

Let's not forget that the Pakistan military was infused with a heavy dose of radical Islamic fundamentalism by Gen Zia during his regime. That religious zeal is the main driving force for the extremists who are still in Pakistani military today. It comes as no surprise that Al-Qaeda has bounced back a good 5 years after a crushing defeat - it was not completely eliminated in the first place. It has been helped by elements in the ISI whom Musharaff does not want to confront for fears of creating more divisions in an already divided army, which hates co-operating with the US against its former best pals. Hence the innumerable promises by Pakistan to fight with the US forces against the resurgence.

The US has become increasingly frustrated with Pakistan's promise to help quell A-Qaeda and hence the recent attack by the US directly on Paki soil.

It basically boils down to whether the US/NATO presence can be in Afghanistan for decades to come. Pakistan is hoping that it wont remain there for too long.

If by any chance, the Taliban comes back and the US thinks enough is enough, watch how quickly Pakistan will patch up again with the Taliban.

Dan:

Here, from a Pakistani political blogger, is a reasonable theory on what might be going on. It has less to do with religion, and more to do with the Pakistani military's worries of Indian influence in Afghanistan.

As long as America's WOT continues, and Pakistan benefits militarily from the US, AQ needs to exist. Pakistan has realized that a prolonged protracted hostility with the Indians is not in their economic interest. Having a 1.1billion booming neighbor is a great thing. I think there is a lot of pressure from the elites in Pakistan to make nice with India, and if that means Kashmir issues goes, no problem.

The short answer is that for Pakistan to tolerate terrorism against India risks nuclear escalation. For Pakistan to tolerate the use of its territory to support terrorist violence against US/NATO forces in Afghanistan has had no consequences.

The long answer is that US/NATO strategy ignores history. Instead of our forces attacking Taliban/al-Qaida camps inside Pakistan, which will only deepen the front and arouse hostility in the wider region, a better strategy would be for the Afghans to grant complete autonomy to the Pashtun territory on their side of the border, so as to create half of the Pashtun state that Afghanistan proposed in the 1920s. US/NATO forces would then withdraw west to friendly territory (Tajik/Hazara).

Under this scenario, the Taliban could take power over the newly autonomous Pashtun region and bring al-Qaida with them. But this would actually be the beginning of the end for both of them.

Pashtun relations with Pakistan are likely to deteriorate if tribes on the Pakistan side of the border see a Pashtun state on the other side enjoying de facto independence and beckoning them to join. Pashtuns inside Pakistan today are already on very bad terms with Islamabad.

To prevent getting caught in the crossfire, the Taliban and al-Qaida will have to take sides. If they side with the Pashtuns, Pakistan will then cut its ties to the Taliban and al-Qaida. If the Taliban and al-Qaida remain loyal to Pakistan, they will become enemies of the Pashtuns.

Al-Qaida may be evicted either way because with an autonomous state (ie. something to lose that Pashtuns have never before had), the Pashtuns may want to minimize unnecessary friction with their neighbors. How long the Taliban themselves endure may also be a question since the Pashtuns have an earlier twentieth century history of moderation and will have less of a nationalist grievance (and less fear of being dominated in a larger Afghanistan) to fuel extremism.

Pakistan needs more of an incentive to cut its ties to all terrorist groups. For that to happen, it may make sense to create a Pashtun state on the Afghan side of the border.

The Pakistanis realize they can nowlonger wrest Kashmir from India by force - either through direct military conflict or by sponsoring terrorist groups. But that does not mean that the terrorist groups do not serve some purpose. Some quarters in Pakistan gain satisfaction from seeing India hobbled on the global stage. After all, a nation which cannot keep its own house in order can hardly be taken as a serious global power.

But the private sector in Pakistan does seem eager to put Kashmir aside and get down to business. But they do not have much say in governance matters - the military does. So long as there is some instability in the region where the U.S. needs Pakistani help, there is not much incentive to crack down harder on the Islamists in Pakistan.