Hmm. I've been reading Kurlantzick's books (very slowly). I think he confuses "soft power" with the real issue, which is the growing ability of the Chinese to provide exit options for leaders disinclined to comply with US and European conditions. This not only provides the ability to actually exit, but also increases the leverage of these states with the US (and with Europe).

(I've been meaning to blog about this rather simple point for a while, as it relates to a larger project I've just started.)

PS: Tom Wight and I mention this issue at the end of our recent article on American Empire. Not so much a "soft power" issue in the Nye sense of the term (attractive power), but, as you note, an "economic power" issue and, moreover, and issue of control and influence.

I'm not sure there's any significant difference between 'soft power' and 'economic power', especially when the economic power comes in the form of carrots and more carrots, not US-style sticks.

Name a country with significant soft power which lacks economic power.

Jon H: the question isn't whether or not economic power contributes to "soft power," but whether the relevant dynamics here derives from "soft power." The term gets thrown around a lot, but it actually has a rather specific meaning and doesn't just amount to "forms of power that aren't military."

Jon H: economic power may or may not contribute to "soft power," but the question really hangs on whether or not the influence involved here has anything to do with "soft power."

I've always been pretty skeptical of the whole "soft power" analysis, believing it logically included so many forms of influence exercised by one state over others as to be all but useless.

Setting theory aside for one moment, though, recall that one of the most attractive things about Marxism in what used to be called the Third World was its provision of a theory allowing elites in power to stay in power, do with their enemies what they liked, and monopolize all power in the state. Nothing about Western notions of development and democracy provides any guarantees that governments in Africa, for example, or some nations in Asia will be able to do any of these things. And guarantees are what many of these governments are looking for.

The expansion of Chinese influence today offers some of what Marxism used to -- a rebuttal to the West's offer to take up a (usually subordinate) place in a global economy operating according to Western rules. Objectively, it may appear as if China is buying off elites of countries rich in natural resources it needs, and will discard them once the resources are gone. From the standpoint of the elites themselves, though, China offers a degree of shelter now from Western demands to follow Western standards of conduct, and resources with which to solidify their own grip on their respective countries. There are limits to the appeal China has, but in some parts of the world that appeal is very great at the moment.

Darfur is a good example of Cinese soft power in action where it provides a bulwark against the possible sactioning of the ongoing genocidal arabisation.