Perhaps I'm missing the point of your question, but isn't it fairly obvious that the United States uses institutions such as the UN when it suits its interests (i.e. Myanmar). Of Course, we would like Musharaff to abandon emergency rule and move back to a semi-democratic form of government, but aren't our interests (defined by the current administration) that Pakistan remain a viable ally and continue to have leeway when cracking down on dissent so long as it helps efforts on the war on terror. I don't agree that this is an effective strategy, but isn't that how the administration views the situation, and therefore why we are not advocating the UN to get involved.

1. Burma's tentative steps towards openness were reported by the U.N. special envoy who's been working with the Burmese Junta. I think we can safely trust U.N. operatives to portray their own efforts in the most positive light.

2. Hasn't Musharraf also been making tentative steps towards openness? Promising a vote in January, relaxing the restrictions on Bhutto, etc.? These moves don't seem any more or less substantive than what Gambari is reporting from Burma.

I dunno, Dan.
What does it say, then, that Iran is seemling undeterred in its efforts to acuire atomic weapons? Has the US not made efforts to work through the UN? Has the US not attempted bilateral talks?

How 'bout Syria? North Korea?

What exactly is your point?

I dunno, Dan.
What does it say, then, that Iran is seemingling undeterred in its efforts to acuire atomic weapons? Has the US not made efforts to work through the UN? Has the US not attempted bilateral talks?

How 'bout Syria? North Korea?

What exactly is your point?

I dunno, Dan.
What does it say, then, that Iran is seemingling undeterred in its efforts to acuire atomic weapons? Has the US not made efforts to work through the UN? Has the US not attempted bilateral talks?

How 'bout Syria? North Korea?

What exactly is your point?

This interview suggests that the relationship with Pakistan is much more complicated and delicate than the one with Myanmar.

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16251052

I was sort of hoping Dan would post on it to get a theory-informed, and perhaps skeptical take.

I don't have a strong opinion about the effectiveness of UN pressure on Myanmar, the effectiveness of US pressure on Pakistan, or the nuances of actual priorities in the agendas of the UN or US in either case. I do think, though, that there are enough important differences between the two situations that is unwise to reason backwards from differences in outcomes to differences in the effectiveness of different kinds of diplomatic pressure.

For example, isn't Myanmar more of a basket case compared to its neighbors and peers than Pakistan is? When mainland China liberalized in various ways --- not terribly liberal now, but rather less like Myanmar than it used to be --- I don't think it was much due to diplomatic pressure. I'd guess that painful comparisons to Taiwan and Hong Kong were a bigger factor. It's hard to tell, but it wouldn't surprise me if such comparisons were the biggest factor. Today I'd guess that Myanmar finds such comparisons about as acutely painful as China once did. Meanwhile, for Pakistan such comparisons might be more of the kind of chronic irritation that middle-of-the-road screwed-up regimes routinely endure for decades.

Your premise is flawed. Burma is not moving in the direction you claim. Smarten up and learn to read between the UN double-speak.

Gee, tough crowd. No sale here for the Drezner hypothesis, obviously.

I don't know very much about either situation, but it seems to me that you might be reading too much into one isolated example.