Niger's response has always reminded me of Python's take on cannibalism in the British Navy: "There is no cannibalism in the British Navy. And when I say none I mean there is a certain amount."

From an international relations perspective, slavery's persistence would seem to pose a significant challenge to theoretical approaches that emphasize the power of transnational norms to eradicate or regulate certain forms of behavior.

Well, that depends on whether you buy into the "strong" or "weak power of norms" argument. Certainly if one takes the strong position that over time norms should develop that can eradicate certain forms of behavior, than yes, certainly these cases would falsify that theory (as, unfortunately, does the case of cannabilism). However, it seems that this case supports the weak argument regarding regulation. While this form of slavery exists it certainly isn't as widespread as in past eras. Additionally, the rationale offered in the article for Nigeria's behavior ("Niger’s government came to fear that a massive release of slaves would draw unwelcome attention to slavery’s existence in the country.") demonstrates how the norm against slavery functions in a regulatory fashion. Unfortunately in this case Nigeria dealt with this existing norm by attempting to hide its violation, but the fact that they were concerned at all with what recognition of this problem would mean for their state suggests that norms can regulate behaviors to some degree. Weak norms theories are useful, as long as their limitations are acknowledged.

Confronted by a festering moral abomination like slavery, academics like the patrons of Cheers are apt to cry: Norms!

This was not the only tool used to fight slavery in the past, of course.

Confronted by a festering moral abomination like slavery, academics like the patrons of Cheers are apt to cry: Norms!

This was not the only tool used to fight slavery in the past, of course.

Absolutely right! Norms by themselves cannot solve problems of such magnitude, but what they can do is act as a mechanism that generates a) a moral code that circumscribes behavior so that some will not indulge in it, and b) impose high social and economic costs on others who feel no moral obligation to adhere to the norm. Sometimes actors really do feel that an act is "inappropriate" and will refrain from it, but more often they fail to act because of the high costs connected to the action due in large part to the prevelance of the norm.

Norms certainly aren't the whole story (and I am not a fan of arguments that make that strong of a case for norms), but they are often a useful mechanism for regulating behavior.

"In America and Europe, there is at least some hope of recourse to the authorities. India and Pakistan have banned debt bondage but struggle to enforce the law."

Nor is there any guarantee that the arrow of history points only in one direction. See also, the bankruptcy bill recently passed in the US. How long will it take for inheritable indebtedness to follow inescapable indebtedness?

bp32,
I'd be interested in hearing your thoughts about how norms explain the persistance of debt bondage in parts of modern South Asia. Normspeak is a bit beyond me--I am but a humble historian. What I can say is that debt servitude cannot be disaggregated from the larger social universe of the (let's say Bihari, for example) countryside where it is most prevalent. If you were to outlaw (as has been tried) the practice, that would do nothing to change the caste-based discrimination and local power dynamics of which it is the cornerstone. So long as low-caste peasants remain without outside assistance (and none has been forthcoming from New Delhi or elsewhere) there will be no change in their lives. On the other hand, with every intrusion of the modern world into their villages (via tv, the internet, outside organizations) and with increasing opportunities of escape (to cities and beyond) this problem will shrink.

As for you, Doug, I suggest you keep the phone number for the ACLU handy at all times. That way when Citibank puts you on the auction block for nonpayment of your credit card bill you'll have some recourse.

I love the moaning about this bill--can someone tell me what is inherently "fair" about your neighbors running up thousands in unpayable consumer debt and then declaring bankruptcy? Who do you think picks up the tab ultimately? Hint: not the tooth fairy.

I'd be interested in hearing your thoughts about how norms explain the persistence of debt bondage in parts of modern South Asia. Normspeak is a bit beyond me--I am but a humble historian.

Kelli,

First of all I personally do not think of historians as humble. They are brilliant, integral actors in the process of inquiry and discovery (well, the good ones at least :) Second, since I do not know a great deal about this particular issue in South Asia I cannot claim that this is the best representation of what a good norm-based explanation would be—but here goes:

I think you are absolutely right that you cannot disaggregate this problem from the larger (or, I would say, more pertinent) social universe it is embedded in. Formalizing a norm against debt bondage (i.e. essentially legislating it as illegal) is certainly not enough. For the norm to have any effect relevant authority figures in society must begin to adopt the norm. This may take place for various reasons, for example that actors in New Delhi develop the ability and will to punish violators of the norm. This negative incentive is the one most likely to curtail the practice against those most likely to benefit from its practice. As more and more actors abide by the norm (whether it’s for material or moral reasons) there will be less of a support network for those actors and the practice should also decline. Unless these actors have reason to believe that their actions will be viewed negatively by a relevant audience (i.e. actors in New Delhi—those that can actually sanction them), they will not change their behavior and norms cannot have any effect. This all depends on the actions of those in New Delhi, since the dominoes need to start falling there.

So how/why do they start to fall? Possibly because enough (key/strategic) actors internationally have also adopted a norm against debt slavery (again, for either material or moral reasons) and are committed to its enforcement. These actors become an audience that India needs to satisfy for various economic and political reasons, so they decide to crack down on those regions that still practice debt bondage as a signal to international audiences that they too are dedicated to the norm.

What this all amounts to, and I think you correctly pointed it out, is that these regions are still somewhat isolated from the “global community” (boy I hate to use this term) that has adopted the norm. Once the global community brings these regions within their reach/sight (i.e. by specifically pressuring the federal government of India on precisely this issue and these regions) then we may begin to see a decrease in this practice. It is very hard to displace an established norm, especially one for which a number of powerful actors have a great incentive to preserve. The key would be to challenge that existing norm by creating such a negative incentive for its persistence that actors are coerced into changing. Once the practice changes new norms can (but may not) develop around it, thereby spreading the norm against slavery to further reaches of the globe.

Not sure how good that was (again, I don’t know all the particulars and am rushing here)…