I wish to encourage Dan to pursue this line of thinking to its logical conclusion, with the reward that we will call it the Drezner Paradox, named after the Fermi Paradox, when he gets there.

The Fermi Paradox arrises from apparent contradiction between high estimates of the probability of the existence of extraterrestrial civilizations and the lack of evidence for or contact with such civilizations. Fermi famously asks "where are they?".

And so it is the Iranian Moderates, the supposed great mass of Iranian common folk who yearn for peace, freedom, and democracy, but who never seem to have any actual effect on Iranian policy, and who are one bad western policy mistake away from following their hated leaders into nuclear apocalypse.

Dan's not ready to go this far yet, but when he is ready, the Drezner Paradox will defined as question that arrises in reposnse to the apparent contradiction between high estimates of the the existence and influence of Iranian Moderates and the lack of evidence for or impact of such moderates.

"Where are they?"

Related to Jos' comment is this question: If Ahmadinejad were to be forced out, who would replace him? The man was supposedly elected democratically, how likely is it he would be replaced with a Gorbachev-like reformer that can (a) work within the theocracy's strictures and (b) implement real, actual reforms without (c) playing the "evil U.S." card?

Congratulations, Dan, on having Drezner's Paradox named after you! I believe Drezner's Paradox is another example of Stigler's Law...

I also believe there are some low-key ways to handle Iran without giving Ahmadinejad carte blanche. One way is to take action only after Ahmadinejad does something that clearly legitimates retaliation, e.g. Iranian armed forces actually crossing the border.

Another is to take actions that do not violate Iranian sovereignty, such as attacking Iranian agents and "volunteers" in Iraq.

A third is deniable proxies -- such proxies must be at least as popular in the Arab Street as Ahmadinejad is, so that would probably be the Saudis and definitely not Israel!

And a fourth method is covert operations. ("Softly, softly, catchee monkey.")

I would assert that the U.S. must take the "high road" for a while, which might require something along the lines of overcompensation.

Look at the facts: the United States has a significant military presence in Afghanistan (along Iran's Eastern border), as well a a significant presence in Iraq, (along the Iran's Western border). Although Prof. Drezner doesn't like the menu of options on the table, this scenario was not unbeknownst to U.S. planners, and is one of the many strategic realities that were ignored in the push to go to war in Iraq. Iran can easily make the case that its national security is threatened, since it is surrounded by an ideological enemy that unilaterally invaded a neighbor expressly for the purposes of regime change. The reasons behind Iran's push for nuclear capability don't require much stretching of the imagination.

Therefore, the U.S. has bound itself into a strategic scenario where there are limited options. As Ms. Maggioni states in her article, the typical American response must be tempered in order not to embolden and empower Ahmadinejad (The U.S. did it in Europe for 50 years, so it certainly can be done now). Hopefully, President Bush and cronies will continue exercise some restraint. Attacking Iran would be a dreadful mistake at this point in America's Middle East experiment, at the very least, because of an over-stretched military.

Your post skips over another question ... how much control does Ahmadinejad actually have over Iran's foreign and military policy? We certainly heard enough about how his predecessor (Khatami) lacked that control.